

Attach. to LK
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copy 2 of 27
6 April 1956

REQUIREMENTS PROBLEM RES: DCID 4/5

1. You requested that, in collaboration with representatives of IAC agencies, I conduct a review of the existing provisions for the development and coordination of information requirements and collection tasks in conformity with established Priority National Intelligence Objectives. This was explained to the IAC in IAC-D-58/5, January 28, 1955.

2. Description of the existing provisions:

a. Priority National Intelligence Objectives, as approved by the IAC, authorize the fundamental direction which the community's intelligence production and collection efforts should take. They do not, however, serve as the sole or exclusive guide to the work of either research or collection offices, each of which devotes a portion of its effort to meeting "departmental" intelligence needs. These "departmental" intelligence needs coincide in many instances with the needs expressed in the Priority National Intelligence Objectives.

b. In the course of research to meet Priority National Intelligence Objectives and departmental needs, research offices automatically ascertain gaps in available information which require collection action to fill. Such research will in certain fields be subject to some coordination: for atomic energy thru JAIC; for science and technology, SMC; for guided missiles, GMEC; for economics, EIC; and for basic intelligence, NIS.

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c. While such committees have in the past engaged in some coordination of requirements, this should be confined to very important requirements rating a high priority. In general, requirements which pertain to research pursued in keeping with agreements reached by such coordinating committees should flow normally rather than thru committee machinery. Usually research offices include (or are closely associated with) so-called "Requirements Officers". These "Requirements Officers" serve as middle men between research and collection components. Their services are essential because of the size and complexity of our intelligence system which makes extensive direct individual contact between analysts and collectors administratively unfeasible. It is the function of these research office Requirements Officers to (a) insure that Washington resources are exploited before making requests on the field; (b) insure that the desired information is expressed in the form most clearly understandable and usable by the collector(s); and (c) insure that the request for information does not duplicate other requests from the same office. It should be noted here that the Requirements Officer is not responsible for determining the substance of the information desired; he is only responsible for modifying or expanding the request so that it will be as comprehensible as possible to the collector. The responsibility for determining and expressing the need rests with the analyst. The need expressed by the analyst in turn depends upon the research tasks to which he has been assigned. It should also be noted

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that the "coordination" performed by these requirements officers is essentially limited to requests originating within their own research components. (Requirements emanating from the research components of CIA, or submitted from any part of the intelligence community to a CIA collection facility are subjected to a further "coordination" by the Office of Central Reference. This office reviews the selection made by the research office of the collector most appropriate to obtain the desired information, makes a determination of the collector to assume the responsibility and insures that a request does not unprofitably duplicate other requests already levied.)

4. The collection offices of the IAC agencies also include "requirements" elements whose task it is to act as a focal point in dealing with research components and further to insure that any given requirement does not duplicate one which has already been received and acted upon. They are usually a part of the collecting offices reports machinery which engages in a cyclical system of requirements, reports, and evaluations. It should be noted that these offices do not decide if collection will be undertaken. That is a command decision of collection supervisors.

5. The above outline delineates the general procedure by which the need for an analyst for information is transmitted to a collector whose task it is to obtain the information. There are, of course, exceptions and special inter-agency arrangements have been established which permit decisions on priorities for collection as limited resources might require: USCIB and IPC.

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4. In considering the problem posed in IAC-D-50/5 in the light of the procedures generally followed by the intelligence community as outlined above, certain lines of inquiry are explored below:

a. A review of the existing provisions for the development and coordination of information requirements in conformity with Priority National Intelligence Objectives will not be concerned basically with the activities of requirements officers attached either to research or to collection elements since these officers are concerned not with determining the substance of requirements or whether collection will be undertaken, but rather with their efficient and effective transmittal to those collectors who may be able to meet the need expressed in the requirements. Such a review, rather, must directly involve the administration and management of research components, since the substance of requirements stems directly and solely from the tasks assigned the research components by their chiefs and the collection of information finally depends on the administration of the collection facilities. In other words, the degree to which requirements are "developed and coordinated" in conformity with Priority National Intelligence Objectives depends upon the degree to which the tasks undertaken by the research components have been developed and coordinated in conformity with the Objectives.

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b. In the present framework of the intelligence community, collection tasks, developed in accordance with the needs of the research components, are allocated to collectors within certain areas of responsibility in keeping with the NSCIDs (NSCID 2, 5, 7, etc.). The individual collection office, acting within the sphere assigned to it by appropriate directive, endeavors to meet the needs expressed to it by research offices. A review of the "development of collection tasks" thus again leads back to a review of the administration and direction given to research components, from which derive the needs which collectors try to meet.

c. Collection offices do not and in the nature of things can not concentrate all their efforts, plan their activities, and strive to build their resources toward meeting Priority National Intelligence Objectives. Each collection facility has been allocated a definite sphere of responsibility by NSCID, and must operate within that sphere. External considerations place definite limitations upon each collector. The Department of State, for example, is responsible for overt collection overseas of political information. If requirements stemming from research to meet Priority National Intelligence Objectives were the primary or only factor governing the allocation of the political reporting resources of the Department, the distribution of overseas personnel of the Foreign Service would be vastly different from what it actually is. In reality, however, the

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Department's allocation of resources is dictated by such factors as the limitation on the number of diplomatic personnel who can be stationed at posts behind the Iron Curtain, limitations on the useful information which such personnel are able to collect, and by other demands for political information not related to Priority National Intelligence Objectives. #1 provides an equally striking example of the same phenomenon. A substantial portion of #1 resources are allocated to areas and activities which are not directly related to Priority National Intelligence Objectives. Considering the difficulties and risks which make successful and fruitful penetration of the Iron Curtain so problematic, it would seem imprudent to expect #1 to allocate resources in a manner which, while in accordance with Priority National Intelligence Objectives, would in fact be wasteful and futile and which, by draining off the available funds and manpower, would deny research offices useful information from other areas of lower overall priority.

5. The above considerations lead to the conclusion that the allocation of collection resources to various tasks is a command decision by the Chief of each collection facility; a decision made not only -- or even necessarily primarily -- in the light of Priority National Intelligence Objectives, but in the light of all the factors affecting the capabilities and limitations of the facility, as well as all of the requirements placed upon it.

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6. Insofar as collectors are faced with competition for requirements and where in fact capabilities exist to respond to such, they might well inquire of the originator of the requirements whether they are identifiable as supporting NPICs and if so, which NPIC. This procedure has in fact been applicable thru the IPC and to a certain extent the USCIB. Similar mechanisms could be readily established at the point where the collectors want such.

7. NSCIDs and other directives specify areas of responsibility among collectors, either by subject area (NSCID 2, 10) or by method of collection (NSCID 5, 7). NSCID 2 and DCID 2/1 provide a mechanism for coordinating overt collection tasks overseas. With regard to the coordinating responsibility assigned to Chiefs of Mission overseas by DCID 2/1, the Department of State has, over the years, endeavored to insure that coordination is effected thru procedures appropriate to each post. As a result of these efforts, DCID 2/1 is now, in general, being implemented in a reasonably satisfactory manner. The IAC agencies under the leadership of the Department of State have in the last two years sent instructions to their representatives urging coordination of collection requirements as received in the field in order to obtain maximum benefit from the capabilities available. The replies give evidence that the field is complying with these instructions. Your committee does not believe a further review of overseas coordination, as it pertains to the problem at hand, is required. NSC 10-6 places upon the DCI responsibility for coordinating overt and covert collection activity. This responsibility is discharged principally by not accepting for clandestine collection by CIA requirements which can be obtained thru overt means.

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8. At the outset of its post-mortem experience the IAC requested that the members prepare a single report on actions they had taken in pursuance of a post-mortem. This was done in the case of China -- ~~NSA-27~~ (see report and IAC-D-574). Thereafter and in lieu thereof, the agencies were each asked to take such implementing action as feasible in response to each post-mortem. While the original procedure might be profitably reinstituted it would not be responsive to the problem at hand inasmuch as the requirements emerging from post-mortems are not necessarily, and in many cases are not, in line with NPIOs. Your committee does not recommend the reestablishment of the original post-mortem procedure as a means of making collection more responsive to NPIOs.

9. There is the possibility that the IAC might establish a subcommittee to expand the NPIOs into an IAC approved requirements list in order to insure that requirements are indeed responsive to NPIOs. Valid requirements follow not precede research and consequently we do not believe such an exercise would be profitable. It would in any event entail an enormous amount of paper work and time. The subject areas regarding which the IAC agencies can usefully coordinate their research programs (and thus their requirements) in terms of NPIOs have already been identified and subcommittees established, or if the IAC has not, it can do so at will. It is believed unnecessary and unwise to try to effect "coordination" where a major overlap of interests does not exist. We do not recommend a new IAC subcommittee either to coordinate research programs overall or to insure that research programs are responsive to NPIOs.

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10. Each agency or research component thereof has stated that its research program is responsive to NPI's. Such programs will be affected as national changes occur in national problems as reflected by needs of the JCS, its planning board or individual policy or operating agencies.

Summary Conclusion:

11. That no new provisions are required for the development and coordination of information requirements and collection tasks in conformity with NPI's. It may be that in the future intelligence problems will arise which would require new provisions such as CMC or the IPC. In so, the JCS is in a position to initiate whatever is required.

PCS/DCI: JCR: pas (6 Apr 1956)

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